iv.Defending a theological account of equality

Many of us take our place on the Equality and Diversity committees of our universities and rightly so. As Christians (Anglicans) we have a profound theological commitment to the equality of all persons as those created by, reconciled to and (to be) redeemed for God: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Yet, we can find ourselves in an uncomfortable position around the table, desirous of equality yet inhibited from articulating the grounds for our conviction.

The equality and diversity agenda assumes a generally unspoken secular pluralist perspective, and is currently shaped by a ‘protected characteristics’ approach of which nine are presently recognised (Equality Act 2010):

• Age
• Disability
• Gender reassignment
• Marriage and civil partnership
• Pregnancy and maternity
• Race
• Religion and belief
• Sex
• Sexual orientation

Thus while ‘religion and belief’ is recognised and supported, and thus our ‘right’ to be at the table confirmed, any ‘religious’ insights we may wish to bring to the discussion are relativised as but one view among many that are held (a priori defined) to be of equal value. Thus the value of our Anglican (Christian) perspective is at once both affirmed and undercut.

The assumed and enforced equality of ‘religion and belief’ is close to being a form of ‘repressive tolerance’ (Herbert Marcuse) that gives up on any quest for truth by assuming that all points of view demand equal respect. Within such a purview there can be no room to attempt to distinguish stronger from weaker arguments, opinion from reason, sense from nonsense. At most there can only be a competition for subscribers, a popularity contest; it is all a matter of ‘personal choice’. Significantly, the assumed secular, pluralist perspective is not itself counted as a ‘belief’ to receive the same treatment, but occupies the position of the (unchallenged) shaping metanarrative.

What then would happen to Christianity (or any religious belief) that conformed to this metanarrative? It would need to give up any universal claim for what it believes, make personal choice the absolute and itself the variable, and retreat to the private realm with little or no public entitlement to attention. To put it bluntly, it would be required to adapt itself into a consumer product in a market of ‘spiritual goods’ as one product competing for market share amongst others.

But then Christianity would no longer be itself. Christianity only survives in authentic form as long as it remains possible to link the particular, historical, contingent and concrete (Jesus of Nazareth) with the universal, eternal and necessary (God) (c.f. Moltmann, 1968). If this link is severed, Christianity (at least in any historically recognisable form) dissolves. It cannot become a merely private spiritual commodity for facing the contingencies of life without a sizeable and unacknowledged remainder. It is not that Christianity is already in possession of the universal; it is that its inherent quest and orientation is towards the universal, towards God.

In the context of a Church Foundation University, one must be wary of certain forms of privilege for the Anglican narrative. But that is not what is being argued for here. Rather, there is a need to expose the ‘repressive tolerance’ of certain assumptions contained within the ‘equality and diversity’ agenda for the sake of and in the name of the academic freedom which lies at the heart of a university worth its name. People are free to believe what they choose, but such belief cannot be immune from the exercise of argument and reasoned judgement. Neither can there be any assumed straight-line connection between what is popular and what is best. And the hidden assumptions of secular pluralism need to be exposed and examined, for the sake of all religion and beliefs.